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Abstract 
 
The negative effect of quits on the willingness of firms to provide on-the-job training 
is well-documented in the theoretical literature (Becker, 1964). In this paper we 
explore the strength of this effect by solving a firm’s dynamic optimisation problem 
where there is uncertainty about future productivity and non-zero firing costs. We find 
that the degree to which quit rates affect hiring and training depend on the ratio of 
firing to hiring costs. As this ratio rises, the negative effect of quits becomes less 
important, eventually reversing itself. We also describe how quit rates affect the firing 
decision.  We conclude by highlighting some testable implications of our analysis.   
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I. Introduction  
According to human-capital theory, firms investing in specific human capital prefer 
hiring and employing workers who – for a given level of innate productivity – are 
unlikely to quit for non-wage reasons.  Investing in the training of these more ‘loyal’ 
workers yields higher expected returns. This quitting effect is often used as an 
explanation of male-female wage differentials: firms invest less in women because 
they are more likely to quit for non-wage reasons. An objective of our paper is to 
show how the strength of this result depends on the ratio of firing to hiring costs when 
there is uncertainty about the level of future labour productivity.  
In the presence of uncertainty about future productivity, employment protection or 
other firing costs result in a reduced incentive for firms to hire and train new workers, 
and introduce a distortion into the economy.  Under these circumstances, quits may 
act as a second distortion that alleviates some of the adverse consequences of the first 
in the spirit of the theory of the ‘second best’ (Lancaster-Lipsey, 1956). When firms 
are prevented from firing their employees at will, higher quit propensities are no 
longer seen as reducing the attractiveness of possible hires to the same extent. 
Employers who – in a world with no demand uncertainty and no firing costs – would 
avoid hiring more mobile workers will become more inclined to hire them as 
uncertainty and employment protection costs increase. However, it still holds that the 
higher are the costs of training, the more firms value worker loyalty as in Becker 
(1964:29). We demonstrate below that the attractiveness of a mobile worker is 
increasing in both the ratio of firing-to-hiring costs and in the degree of uncertainty 
about future productivity. 
Our analysis also has some interesting implications for the firing decision. With 
employment protection and uncertainty about future productivity, the firing decision is 
also an inter-temporal investment decision. The Becker analysis would then tell us 
that – ceteris paribus – when productivity is not expected to recover, firing a loyal 
worker would yield higher expected returns, as the firm is reducing its future losses 
for a longer expected period of time. But our analysis suggests that this too is  an 
investment under uncertainty. This is because  productivity may recover in the future, 
thereby making it optimal to employ the worker. Thus the firm may wait longer and 
suffer a larger drop in productivity before firing the loyal worker – especially if the 
cost of hiring a worker is high. Our results in this regard mirror our analysis of the 
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hiring decision. When the ratio of firing-to-hiring costs is low (high), and there is 
uncertainty about future productivity, firms are more inclined to fire a mobile (a loyal) 
worker.  
This combination of uncertainty and a high level of firing costs relative to hiring 
and training costs is thus likely to reduce the bias of employers’ hiring and firing 
decision against mobile individuals. Such individuals may now find it easier to find 
jobs and be less likely to lose them. In Booth and Zoega (1999) we derived a dynamic 
efficiency-wage model with uncertainty about the level of future productivity, and in 
which firms set wages to deter quits. There were no layoffs in that model, and hence 
the level of firing costs did not form part of the argument. In this present paper we 
extend that analysis, in order to show how the choice between workers who differ 
only in terms of their quit rate may depend on the level of firing costs. The higher are 
firing costs,  the weaker is the quitting effect. 
What are employers’ views of labour turnover? Survey evidence on this is hard to 
come by, but analysis of the 1991 Employers’ Manpower and Skills Practices Survey 
of British establishments suggests that firms may not dislike some turnover of their 
workforce. Using these data, Martin (1999) reports that over two out of three 
respondents felt that labor turnover is at the right level. Only one in four thought it 
was too high, while 4% of respondents thought their turnover was too low. Martin 
estimates the upper and the lower bounds to optimal turnover rates as 20% and 1.5% 
respectively. The fact that the lower bound is non-zero suggests that there are benefits 
from turnover. The upper bound is lower where training and hiring costs are greater. 
However, little variation is found in the lower bound across establishments. These 
findings are consistent with our model, since we provide a rationale for firms to prefer 
some turnover if the ratio of firing to hiring costs is very high.1  
Empirical evidence shows that individuals do differ in their quit rates. Studies 
using individual-level surveys suggest that  heterogeneity in quit rates can be captured 
in part by differences in observable characteristics. Both British and US studies show 
that women (especially those with young children) tend to quit more than men 
(Viscusi, 1980; Blau and Kahn, 1981; Meitzen 1986, Royalty, 1998; Booth 
                                                 
1 Roughly half of all establishments had turnover rates of less than or equal to 10%, while the remainder 
had turnover rates in excess of this. Of those workplaces with the lower turnover rates, 9% thought 
turnover was too high, while 84% thought it was ‘about right’. Of the high turnover workplaces, 39% 
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Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano, 1999).2 Royalty (1998) using a sample of US 
workers aged 22-30 in 1987, finds that less-educated women differ significantly in 
their turnover rates from more highly educated women (who behave not much 
differently from men), and that marital status and the presence of a child also have a 
significant impact. Jaeger and Huff Stevens (1999) and Neumark, Polsky and Hansen 
(1999) find that women, blacks and younger workers are more likely to have shorter 
job tenure than men, a finding that is however consistent with both higher quit rates 
and with higher layoff rates for those groups. Booth et al (1999) use the work history 
data from the 1993 wave of the British Household Panel Survey to show that women 
are more likely to leave voluntarily (either to another job or to non-employment) than 
men ceteris paribus, and that younger workers are also more likely to quit.  
In the model developed below, we assume worker heterogeneity in quitting 
propensities. These affect their probability of being hired both directly – by affecting 
the value of their hiring option – and indirectly through wages. We suppose that 
wages are determined following the efficiency wage approach extensively used in the 
literature  (see for Solow, 1979; Calvo, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Phelps, 
1994). This provides a rationale for real-wage rigidity, so that changes in labour 
demand primarily affect the level of employment and not so much the level of real 
wages.  
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
background to the model developed in the paper, and summarise the principal 
assumptions underlying the analysis. In subsequent sections, we develop the model 
and discuss its testable implications. 
 
II. Background and Assumptions 
A. Assumptions 
The representative firm’s problem is to consider its demand for labour – that is, which 
type of worker to hire and the productivity threshold at which to hire each, where 
workers differ only in their propensity to quit. This decision is made by the firm in the 
                                                                                                                                            
thought turnover too high and almost 60% thought they were about right. 
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presence of exogenously given firing costs and technologically given hiring costs that 
vary across two kind of jobs in accordance with the production technology. We make 
the following assumptions: 
 
(i) We consider a representative firm that provides specific training to workers. 
For simplicity, we set the reservation wage of workers who are willing to 
undergo training to zero. All training is provided by the firm, whose 
production technology involves only trained workers. There are two jobs: a 
manual job (for example a typist) requiring little training, and a more complex 
job (for example a computer programmer) involving more training.  
(ii) Workers have stochastic preferences, in the sense that we assume that the 
individual quit rate is exogenously given by b. Workers are heterogeneous 
with respect to their quitting probability, but homogeneous in all other 
respects.  
(iii) The level of severance pay is exogenous to our model,3  and it does not vary 
with the type of job. 
(iv) The firm chooses which worker-type to employ in the high- or low-training-
cost jobs, and which worker-type to lay off first. This is analogous to the 
standard ‘right-to-manage’ assumption used in the trade union literature, 
whereby the firm retains its prerogative of which workers to employ or layoff 
when workers are of equal productivity. To our knowledge there are no rules 
in Europe stipulating affirmative-action hiring or layoff policies, so we believe 
the right-to-manage assumption is a plausible one in this context.  
(v) There is uncertainty about the level of future productivity. This uncertainty 
takes two forms. First, we consider a stochastic process exhibiting persistence, 
namely the continuous time equivalent of a random walk – geometric 
Brownian motion. Second, we consider a stochastic process with mean 
reversion. 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Royalty (1998) uses National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data for 1987 (for a sample aged 22-30 at 
that date). In her first set of specifications she does not distinguish between quits and layoffs, a 
distinction that is vital for our purposes. In her second set of results, she drops job spells ending in 
layoffs from her estimating sub-sample. She finds that less-educated women differ significantly in their 
turnover rates from more highly educated women (who behave not much differently from men). 
3  We use the terms redundancy pay and sevarance pay interchangeably in this paper to mean a cost 
faced by the firm when it has to make a worker redundant due to low productivity and not due to the 
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B. Theoretical Background  
There is a long-standing literature on the importance of quits for firms’ training 
decisions and the possibility of market failure, in particular training externalities. This 
literature goes back to the work of Pigou (1912), who suggested that the amount of 
training provided by firms will be less than socially optimal owing to a quitting 
externality. It also includes the seminal contribution of Becker (1964). With respect to 
specific training, Becker notes (page 29) that worker turnover imposes capital losses 
on firms. “Firms can discourage such quits by sharing hiring costs and the return with 
employees, but they would have less need to discourage them and would be more 
willing to pay for hiring costs if insurance were provided.” Recent contributions to 
this literature include Stevens (1994, 1996), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Chang 
and Wang (1996), amongst others, who claim that imperfect competition in the labour 
market may open the way for market failures in the case of general training, Becker's 
thesis notwithstanding. The role of uncertainty about future output demand and 
productivity has been mostly ignored with a few exceptions (see for example 
Hashimoto 1981; Chang and Wang 1996; Booth and Zoega, 1999). 
 A unifying theme of the literature so far has been the contention that quits 
discourage training (both general and specific) by firms. We confine ourselves to the 
case of specific training and show how the strength of this result depends on the ratio 
of firing to hiring costs. Moreover, we show how it can potentially be reversed if the 
level of firing costs is very high in relation to the level of hiring costs and there is 
uncertainty about future productivity. Our analysis incorporates the insights of 
Malliaris and Brock (1982), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Bentolila and Bertola 
(1990) by explicitly allowing for the option values associated with hiring and firing to 
affect the firm’s employment decisions.4 In our model, these option values vary across 
workers, reflecting their heterogeneous quitting propensities. Unlike the  Bentolila and 
Bertola analysis, we relax the exogenous wage assumption. We let firms set wages to 
deter shirking among workers and then describe the microfoundations of the shirking 
                                                                                                                                            
worker voluntarily quitting. 
4  Paxson and Sicherman (1996) use a similar sort of framework to model an individual’s mobility and 
hours adjustment, when desired hours are stochastic owing to individual preferences, and follow a 
geometric Brownian motion. 
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decision. In particular, we show how a higher quit rate leads – ceteris paribus – to 
higher wages.  
 
 
C. A Measure of the Quitting Effect  
We assume that both training and firing costs are fixed per worker. We will calculate 
a productivity threshold at which it becomes optimal to hire and train the marginal 
worker and relate its value to the worker’s quit rate. In Figure 1 we plot three such 
hypothetical thresholds. The steepness of the threshold is a measure of the strength of 
the relationship between quits and training – the steeper is the threshold, the stronger 
is this effect. Thus a worker with a quit rate of b* would only be hired if productivity 
reaches the levels marked on the figure – a level which is higher, the steeper is the 
threshold. In the extreme case, a negative slope implies a preference for workers with 
a high quit propensity. We will show using a model how the slope depends on the 
level of firing costs, hiring costs and the magnitude of uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
productivity 
  threshold  
     gh   
 
 
 
 
 
         b*                      quit rate     b 
Figure 1. Measuring the Strength of the Quitting Effect 
 
III. The Model 
A. The Stochastic Environment and the Firm’s Decision Problem 
We model the hiring- and firing decisions as inter-temporal investment decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty about future productivity. This amounts to an optimal 
stopping problem with respect to filling (or “emptying”) the two positions – the job 
weak effect of 
quitting 
negative effect of 
quitting  
strong effect of 
quitting 
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requiring little training (the typist) and the job requiring more training (the computer 
programmer) – and the firm has to make a binary choice in each case. One alternative 
is to hire (fire) a worker based on his or her quitting probability, while the other 
involves continuation with the current workforce – further waiting.  
 Current profits are defined as follows in the absence of hiring and firing,  
( ) ( )( )( ) )1(                   ,1          ,;,1,, ≤−−=Π θθ ttttt wNbuwlNgNwg  
where N denotes the number of employed workers, l is the level of shirking (the 
fraction of the work day spent in an unproductive manner), w the real wage measured 
in units of output, g is a measure of productivity and also the source of uncertainty in 
the model and b denotes the (exogenously given) quit rate. Productivity follows the 
(potentially) mean-reverting process 
( )  (2)                                         ,gdzgdtggdg σµ +−=  
where µ is the speed of reversion, g  is average productivity, σ the variance 
parameter, and z a Wiener process. Productivity follows a geometric Brownian motion 
if µ = 0 and a mean-reverting process if µ > 0.    
 In order to calculate the value of g at which it becomes optimal to hire each type 
of worker given the size of the current workforce, one first has to calculate the value 
of employing this marginal worker. This can then be compared to the hiring costs. Use 
of Itô's Lemma gives the following Bellman equation for the value of the stock of 
workers; ( )V N g, , in the continuation region where the value of future hires or fires is 
not taken into account, 
( )( )( )[ ] ( ) (3)     ,
2
1;,1max 22 gggN VggVggNVwNbuwlNg
w
V σµλρ θ +−+−−−=
  
and ρ is the real rate of interest. This is an asset-pricing equation for the value of the 
firm when wages are set optimally at each moment in time. The first term in square 
brackets on the  right-hand side shows current profits, equal to the difference between 
output and the total wage bill when wages are at their optimal level. The third term 
represents the loss caused by current quits. The last two terms show the increase in the 
value of the firm caused by changes in the level of productivity.  
The  representative firm sets wages at each moment in time in order to maximise 
profits. This decision is based on the effect wages have on on-the-job effort or 
shirking l. Thus reducing wages may cause profits to fall if workers respond by 
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reducing their effort. We describe the microeconomic foundations of this function in 
Section IV below. Here it needs to be said that the optimal wage does not depend on 
the level of employment in the representative firm but instead on wages, the rate of 
unemployment – which is exogenous to each firm – quitting, discount rates etc. Thus 
we can continue the analysis of hiring and firing by taking the level of wages as given 
and determined by the equation below – the first-order condition with respect to 
wages: 
( )( )[ ] ( ) )4(1,;,;1 1 =−− − buwlbuwlNg wθθ  
 
The left-hand side has the marginal of raising wages benefit – in terms of increased 
output due to less shirking – while the right-hand side has the marginal cost – in terms 
of higher wage costs. We now solve equation (4) for the optimal wage w* and put it 
into equation (3) assuming that the effect of changes in g on w* are sufficiently small 
to be ignored for the time being.5 
In the appendix, we show the calculations used to derive the expected present 
value of the marginal employed worker v N gP ( , ) . 
( ) ( ) ( ) (5)                        . *
1
1,
0
1
∫
∞
−
+−
−
+
−





 −
+
−=
λρ
θ
µ
ρθλ
θθ wdt
e
g
gg
elNggNv
tg
t
P
 
The general solutions for the hiring and firing options have the following forms 
respectively (see the appendix and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p.162), 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) (6)                                  ,;1, 111 1 ββθθ gHlgNAgNv GH −= −  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) (7)                                 ,;1, 212 2 ββθθ gHlgNAgNv GF −= −  
where ( )H ⋅  denotes the confluent hypergeometric function and β1 and β2 are the 
positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation (A15) respectively. To 
satisfy the boundary conditions that ( ) ( )v N v NHG FG, ,0 0 0= ∞ = and  we use the 
positive solution for ( )v N gHG ,  and the negative solution for ( )v N gFG , . The value of 
the marginal employed worker is therefore equal to the sum of ( )v N gP ,  and 
( )v N gFG ,  in the continuation region. This presupposes that a part of the value of 
                                                 
5 We show below that this requires lw – the derivative of shirking with respect to wages – to be large. 
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employing a worker is the value of the option to fire her in bad times. The value of the 
marginal unemployed worker is then equal to the value of the option to hire that 
worker, ( )v N gHG , . 
 
 
B. The Hiring and the Firing Thresholds Defined 
The definitions of the hiring and firing barriers; gH  and gF , are given by the standard 
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The firm would find it optimal to 
exercise the option to hire or fire the marginal worker once g hit one of the two 
barriers. The value-matching conditions follow 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) (8)          ,;1                                                           
;1*
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
0
1
1
2
β
βλρθ
βθθ
βθθ
µ
ρθλ
θθ
HH
HH
tg
H
H
t
gHlNgAT
gHlNgAwdt
e
g
gg
elNg
−+=
−+
+
−





 −
+
−
−
−
∞
−
+−
−
∫
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) (9)        ,;1                                                             
;1*
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
β
βλρθ
βθθ
βθθ
µ
ρθλ
θθ
FF
FF
tg
F
F
t
gHlNgAF
gHlNgAwdt
e
g
gg
elNg
−+=
−+
+
+





 −
+
−−
−
−
∞
−
+−
−
∫
 
where T and F denote training and firing costs respectively.  
The left-hand sides of (8) and (9) show the marginal benefit from hiring/firing a 
worker and the right-hand sides the marginal costs. The marginal benefit of hiring a 
worker is equal to the sum of the present discounted value of his or her productivity 
net of wages, on the one hand, and the value of the option to fire the worker, on the 
other hand. The marginal cost of hiring is then the sum of the direct hiring costs and 
the sacrificed option to hire the worker in the future. The interpretation of the firing 
decision is similar. The smooth-pasting conditions follow. 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[
( )] ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] (10)     ;';1;'+
;1=1
22
1
2
1
21
1
1
1
1
1
0
2
1
2221
11
ββββ
ββθ
βββθθβ
ββθθ
µ
µρθλ
θθ
HHHHHH
HHtg
HH
tg
gHggHglNAgHg
gHglNAdt
eggg
eglNg
+−−
−
−+
⋅
−
−−
−−
∞
−
++−
−
∫
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( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[
( )] ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] (11)      ;';1+ ;' 
;1=1
22
1
2
1
21
1
1
1
1
1
0
2
1
2221
11
ββββ
ββθ
βββθθβ
ββθθ
µ
µρθλ
θθ
FFFFFF
FFtg
FF
tg
gHggHglNAgHg
gHglNAdt
eggg
eglNg
+−+
−−
−+
⋅
−−
−−
−−
∞
−
++−
−
∫
 
 
Equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) are non-linear systematic equations with four 
unknown parameters, g g A AH F, ,   and 1 2 , and can be solved for numerically once the 
solutions for β1 and β2 are found from (A15).  
 Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, p. 420) report that the cost of firing ranges 
from 0.48 months salary in Denmark to 5.24 months salary in France to 15.86 months 
in Italy. We calculate the two thresholds for firing costs equal to 0.25 months salary, 1  
months salary, 2 months salary, 4 months salary and 12 months salary respectively. 
These are in the range of those observed in Denmark (0.48 months), Belgium (1.24 
months), France (5.24 months) and Norway (12 months), but below those for  Spain 
(13.56 months) and Italy (15.86 months). 
 The critical productivity thresholds at which it would become optimal to hire (and 
to fire) workers when we ignore the effect of quitting on wages are shown in Figures 
2-5. They show the effect of the expected quit rate on the hiring and firing thresholds 
for both the case of productivity following a mean-reverting process and a random 
walk when we ignore the effect of changes in quitting on the optimal wage and level 
of shirking. We then consider the indirect effect of quitting through wages in a later 
section. The hiring threshold is always rising in the quit rate for the lower values of 
the firing cost, but for higher values it is falling in the quit rate.  
 
C.  Low Hiring costs – the Case of a Typist 
Figure 2a shows the hiring threshold as a function of the quit rate for the case of low 
hiring costs and no mean-reversion. It can be seen that for low levels of firing costs, 
quits reduce the willingness to train – the threshold is upward sloping. If the cost of 
firing is close to 2/12 (2 monthly wages), the threshold is approximately horizontal. 
For higher levels of firing costs, the thresholds becomes – surprisingly – negative 
sloping. Thus for a given level of hiring costs and a given level of uncertainty, the 
slope of the threshold depends on the level of firing costs. The magnitude of the 
(adverse) effect of quits on hiring and training is a negative function of the level of 
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firing costs – the higher is the level of firing costs, the smaller is the positive slope of 
the threshold. 
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Figure 2a. The effect of quit rates on the hiring threshold of g when 
T=1×w/12 (one month wage) and µ=0.0; F = 0.25, 1,2, 4, 12 monthly 
wages respectively.  Other parameters: σ=0.25, ρ=0.05, g = 1,  θ=1, 
w=1 (annual wage), ( )[ ] 9.0,*;1 =− θbuwl  and N=1. 
 
 
 In terms of equations (8) and (9), higher firing costs reduce the value of the firing 
option. An increase in the quit rate reduces the value of both options. It follows that 
starting with a higher firing cost the effect of higher quit rates is found in a lower 
value of the hiring option – hence a lower cost of hiring – while with hiring costs 
exceeding firing costs the effect is found to a greater exent in the firing option – hence 
in the marginal benefit of hiring. This explains our results. We conclude that while a 
higher quit rate reduces the expected discounted value of employing a typist, it also 
makes hiring less risky in the presence of firing costs – less risky implying a lower 
value of the hiring option. 
 The question arises how the time- or age dependance of quit rates would affect our 
results if we relax our assumption about constant and exogenous quit rates b. For 
example, would the firm prefer workers with rising quit rates to those with falling quit 
rates over their lifetimes? Without complicating the model above we can state the 
answer to this question. Because productivity follows a Brownian motion, changes in 
the productivity over any finite interval of time are normally distributed with a 
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variance that increases linearly with the time interval. For this reason, the firm would 
ideally prefer a worker who is not likely to quit initially but also not likely to stay for a 
very long period.6  
 We now do the calculations for the case of mean-reverting productivity, reflecting 
the situation of a transitory productivity shock. In Figure 3a we show that the 
threshold is now more likely to be upward sloping than before as the hiring decision is 
less risky.  
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Figure 3a. The effect of quit rates on the hiring threshold of g when 
T=1×w/12 (one month wage) and µ=0.4; F = 0.25, 1, 2, 4, 12 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
 
 
 
D. High Hiring costs – the Case of a Computer Programmer 
How do the hiring- and firing thresholds for the computer programmer differ from 
those for the typist in light of the higher hiring costs involved? Will the firm also 
choose a  mobile worker as the first to write a programme if firing costs are 
substantial?  
                                                 
6 We are grateful to a referee for this point. 
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 To see this, we now raise the value of the hiring costs and solve the four equations 
again. The results are shown in Figure 4a for the geometric Brownian motion case. 
They show that, ceteris paribus, it would take higher productivity for the firm to 
invest in the training of a programmer. The figure also shows the threshold is almost 
always upward sloping and steep. The threshold only has a downward-sloping 
segment for the very highest levels of firing costs. Workers with very high quit rates 
are no longer an attractive choice – it does not make sense to train someone to write 
computer programmes who is very likely to quit in the near future. We conclude that 
the adverse effect of quitting on training is much stronger for a given level of firing 
costs in this case. In terms of equations (8) and (9) the quit rate reduces primarily the 
firing option – hence the marginal benefit of hiring. The hiring option is worth less 
than in the case of the typist due to the higher hiring costs. 
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Figure 4a. The effect of quit rates on the hiring threshold of g when 
T=4×w/12 (four month wages) and µ=0.0; F = 1, 4, 8, 16, 48 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
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 In Figure 5a we again see that loyalty becomes more desirable when productivity is 
mean reverting. 
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Figure 5a. The effect of quit rates on the hiring threshold of g when 
T=4×w/12 (four month wages) and µ=0.4; F = 1, 4, 8, 16, 48 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
 
 
E. The Firing Decision 
What about the possibility of firing the workers in the future? The same intertemporal 
considerations have to be taken into account when deciding on their dismissal in the 
future since firing them is also an investment. Firms incur fixed costs of firing each 
worker and in return reduce future losses. Now hiring costs will take the place of 
firing costs in the hiring decision and vice versa.  
 In Figures 2b-5b we find the optimal ranking for the firing decision. In all cases 
but those when the firing costs are trivial, the firm chooses to fire the loyal workers 
first. By firing the loyal workers, the firm gets a higher return on its firing investment 
as they would have stayed longer with the firm if not pushed out. This is the Becker 
argument put on its head – the firing decision is also an intertermporal investment 
decision and quits matter just as much as in the case of the hiring decision 
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Figure 2b. The effect of quit rates on the firing threshold of g when 
T=1×w/12 (one month wage) and µ=0.0; F = 0.25, 1,2, 4, 12 monthly 
wages respectively.  For other parameters see Fig. 2a. 
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Figure 3b. The effect of quit rates on the firing threshold of g when 
T=1×w/12 (one month wage) and µ=0.4; F = 0.25, 1, 2, 4, 12 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
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Figure 4b. The effect of quit rates on the firing threshold of g when 
T=4×w/12 (four month wages) and µ=0.0; F = 1, 4, 8, 16, 48 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
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Figure 5b. The effect of quit rates on the firing threshold of g when 
T=4×w/12 (four month wages) and µ=0.4; F = 1, 4, 8, 16, 48 
monthly wages respectively. Other parameters the same as in Fig 2a. 
 
 An apparent contradiction arises. Should not considerations of risk enter the 
calculation again? Is it not least risky to fire a mobile worker as he would have left 
anyway? This turns out to depend again on the level of hiring costs relative to the 
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level of firing costs. We have seen that these affect the relative size of the hiring- and 
the firing options. Since both are falling in the quit rate, our results depend on which 
has the larger value at zero quit rates. If hiring costs were increased, an increase in the 
quit rate would primarily work to reduce the value of the firing option which is part of 
the marginal cost of firing. This would make the firm fire the  mobile workers first.  
  
F. A Summary of our Results 
We now summarise the results with two propositions: 
The negative effect of quits on training is increasing in magnitude in 
the ratio of hiring- to firing costs. Conversely, the higher is the ratio 
of firing- to hiring costs, the smaller is the negative effect of quits on 
training. 
 
The chances of a loyal worker – that is one with a low quit rate – 
losing his job are decreasing in the ratio of hiring to firing costs.The 
chances of a worker with a high quit rate are increasing in this ratio. 
 
It follows that as we raise the level of firing costs, loyal workers lose some of their 
advantages in terms of both getting a job as well as retaining it. Raising the level of 
firing costs would thus benefit mobile workers at the expense of the loyal ones. 
Our numerical solutions show that it is the ratio of hiring to firing costs that 
matters for both decisions, not their absolute level.7 Moreover, the results do not 
depend on the particular functional form chosen for the production function apart 
from the requirement that it exhibit diminishing returns to labour. The value chosen 
for the parameter θ in the production function does not affect our results 
qualitatively.8  
 
IV. Wage Determination 
We now turn to the microfoundations of the shirking function l. This is important 
because differences in the quit rate between workers may possibly affect wages and 
hence the slope of the thresholds in sections  III-c to III-e. We choose a well-known 
model of the shirking decision that gives real-wage rigidity in the face of demand 
fluctuations. This is an amended version of the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and 
                                                 
7 These are available from the authors upon request. 
8 Numerical solutions for different values of θ –  which measures the returns to labour – are available 
from the authors upon request.  
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Stiglitz (1984).9  
An employed worker gets utility from both consumption C1 and shirking, l.10 
These are his two control variables that he adjusts to maximise expected discounted 
utility subject to the dynamic budget constraints below 
)12(11
1
CAw
dt
dA
−+= ρ  
where A1 denotes the real wealth – in the form of public bonds – of an employed 
worker and ρ is the real rate of interest. By raising his level of current consumption, 
the  worker accumulates less wealth and hence consumes less in the future. By 
increasing the level of shirking, the worker gains instantaneous utility but increases 
the risk that she will be dismissed. The probability of dismissal is equal to m⋅l where  
m is the employer’s monitoring intensity. 
The instantaneous utility function – or felicity function – is the following: 
( ) )13(0,0,0,0,, 1111 <<>> llCClC UUUUlCU  
Letting V denote discounted lifetime utility, the first-order conditions from the 
maximisation of this lifetime utility level by an employed worker are the following: 
( ) )14(, 111 AC VlCU =  
( ) [ ] )15(, 011 VVmlCU l −=  
The worker equates the marginal utility of private consumption to his marginal utility 
of wealth. The worker, similarly, equates the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of 
shirking. The marginal benefit is equal to the instantaneous marginal utility from 
shirking. The marginal cost is equal to the expected fall in lifetime utility due to a rise 
in the probability of detection and dismissal.  
 Using the solution values for C1 and l and the underlying Bellman equation gives 
the familiar equation (16) where b denotes the quit rate, µ is the rate of pure time 
preference, and ml+b is the probability of moving from the employed to the 
unemployed state: 
( ) ( )[ ] )16(, 101111 VVbml
dt
dAVlCUV A −+++=µ  
                                                 
9 We make shirking be a continuous variable while Shapiro and Stiglitz assume that it can only take two 
values, 0 and 1. We also allow for wealth accumulation. 
10 We can think of the variable l as measuring the proportion of time spent at work which is not used for 
productive activities. 
  19
This is an asset equation which describes the value of being employed V1 as a 
function of the instantaneous utility of being employed, the value of being 
unemployed and the transition probability between the two states. The left-hand side 
has the required return and the right-hand side the sum of instantaneous utility 
(dividend) and the expected gain from both wealth accumulation and a change in 
employment status (expected capital gain). 
 The maximisation problem to be solved by an unemployed worker is slightly 
simpler. The worker now only gets utility from consumption, C0 being his only 
control variable,  
( ) )17(0,0, 0000 <> CCC UUCU  
and faces the dynamic budget constraint 
)18(00
0
CA
dt
dA
−= ρ  
where  A0 is denotes the holdings of public bonds by an unemployed worker. The first-
order condition is given in equation (19): 
)19(00 AC VU =  
As in the case of the employed worker, optimal consumption is at the level where the 
marginal utility of private consumption is set equal to his marginal utility of wealth. 
Using the solution value for C0 and the underlying Bellman equation gives the asset-
pricing equation 
( ) [ ] )20(010000 VVa
dt
dAVCUV A −++=µ  
where a is the transition probability out of unemployment. The left-hand side is again 
the required return and the right-hand side the sum of the instantaneous utility and the 
expected gain from both wealth accumulation and a change in employment status. 
 Since the only form of nonhuman wealth is public bonds and all public bonds 
must be held by someone, equations (12) and (18) are related in the following way, 
 
[ ] ( )[ ] )21(01 1100 =−+−+− CAwuCAu ρρ  
 
where u is the rate of unemployment and the first term denotes wealth decumulation 
by the unemployed – the selling of bonds – while the second term denotes the wealth 
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accumulation by the employed – the buying of bonds. 
 Equations (15), (16) and (20) can be simplified and imply equation (22) : 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] )22(,, 0000111111 CAVCUCAwVlCUbamlmlCU AAl −−−−++=+++− ρρµ
 
 We are interested in the effect of quits on wages. To learn from equation (22) 
about the level of wages, we need to go back to equation (4) that describes the firm’s 
wage–setting decision. From that equation it follows that 
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and 
)23(
)1)(1( 21
b
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l
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w
−−−
=
−θ  
The total differential of equation (22) can be used to find the effect of changes in 
quitting and wages on shirking and hence evaluate the sign of (23). The partial 
derivatives found in equation (23) follow: 
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From equations (23)-(27) we conclude that wages are an increasing function of 
productivity – dw/dg > 0 – but that this effect is diminishing in the size of lw. A high 
value of this term justifies our assumption of fixed wages when deriving the 
numerical solutions in sections III-b  to III-e.   
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The effect of quitting on wages – dw/db – is ambiguous. This can be anticipated 
from equation (4) and becomes clear when we substitute equations (24) to (27) into 
equation (23a). There are two effects. First, a higher quit rate gives more shirking, 
hence lower output and hence a higher marginal product of labour which raises the 
marginal benefit of higher wages in terms of increased output. On this count the wage 
should be a positive function of shirking. Second, the  wage turns out to be more 
potent in reducing shirking the higher is the quit rate – lwb > 0 – and this acts to make 
the optimal wage be falling in the quit rate. However, we are interested in 
circumstances in which the indirect effect of quits on hiring and firing going through 
wages acts to reverse our two propositions below. We now assume that the optimal 
wage is a positive function of b: 
)'23(0)( >= bf
db
dw  
This gives  
( ) )28(0)(', >= bFbFw  
where the functional form depends on the form of the utility and hence the value 
function 1AV .   
 The question now arises if the positive effect of quitting on optimal wages is 
sufficient to make our propositions in the previous section invalid. In particular, does 
the induced effect of quitting on wages prevent firms from ever preferring a worker 
with a high propensity to quit. We now approximate equation (28) by the following 
equation: 
( ) )29(1log10 bw ++= αα  
where the quit rates are written as percentages. We then solve for the hiring- and the 
firing threshold while setting α0  equal to one. 
 The dependence of wage on the quit rate b in equation (29) affects both parts of our 
propositions in Section III – that is both the hiring- and the firing decision. We start 
with the effect on the hiring decision.  
 
A. Effect of endogenous wages on the hiring decision 
A positive effect of quitting on wages can make it optimal for firms never to prefer 
mobile workers. We therefore redid the numerical solutions for the case of a high 
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firing costs and low hiring costs and having wages set according to equation (29). We 
found that for α1 < 0.03 our results did not change while for α1 ≥ 0.03 the firm would 
never prefer mobile workers. However, note that this depends on the value of σ – our 
measure of uncertainty. The greater is uncertainty, the higher is this threshold value of 
α1. The  critical wage function is plotted in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Wages and quit rates with wage function: w=1+0.03× log[b +1]. 
 
We can see that in the case of F = 1 and T =1/12,  firms will never hire a mobile 
worker.11 The thresholds are shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.The effect of quit rates on the hiring and firing thresholds of g with w 
= 1 + 0.03× ln(b ×100+1); T = 1/12, F = 1. Other parameters are the same as in 
Figure 2a. 
                                                 
11 The explanation here somehow is irrelevant to value-matching conditions. An increase in wages will 
lead to a fall in effective firing costs and to a rise in effective hiring costs. 
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In the left-hand side panel we find that the hiring threshold is downward sloping for 
fixed wages w = 1 – firms prefer quitters to those who are more likely to stay – while 
the most loyal individual (zero quit rate) is always preferred for our wage function (29) 
with α0 = 0 and α1 = 0.03. However, the ranking does not change in the case of the 
firing decision although the firing threshold becomes less steep – the loyal workers are 
the first to be fired.  
 
B. Effect of endogenous wages on the firing decision 
We also need to look at the case of a high ratio of hiring-  to firing costs. In this case 
firms preferred to fire mobile workers as shown in Figure 2b above. However, the 
wage function (29) now reinforces the earlier effect – hence the second part of our 
propositions above – instead of mitigating it as was the case with the hiring decision. 
When a higher quit rate  raises the level of wages, the mobile workers become a 
primary target for dismissals. First, because they receive higher wages. Second, 
because firing them is less risky since they are more likely to leave on their own 
accord. 
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Figure 8.The effect of quit rates on the hiring and firing thresholds of g with w 
= 1 + 0.03× ln[(quit rates) ×100+1)]; T = 4/12 (four months wages), F =0.25/12 
(one week wages). Other parameters are the same as Figure 4a. 
 
We conclude that while endogenising wages may moderate the implications of our 
analysis for the hiring decision – in particular firms may always prefer loyal workers – 
this is not so in the case of the firing decision.  When the ratio of firing- to hiring costs 
is low, firms may prefer firing mobile workers first despite, or as we have shown in 
part because of, their higher wages. 
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V. Some Testable Implications 
A number of interesting implications emerge form our analysis as relates to the hiring- 
and the firing decision. Most studies show that women quit more than men (see 
above), especially those with young children. The same applies to teenage workers. 
The following two implications follow: 
 
• With high hiring and training costs – that is relative to firing costs –  and 
uncertainty about future productivity, firms would prefer prime-age workers to 
young workers and male workers to females. Thus when labour productivity 
improves, prime-age  males are the first to benefit. 
  
• With high hiring and training costs – again relative to firing costs – firms would 
prefer laying off young workers over prime-aged workers and women over men. 
 
It follows that both mean and median expected tenure for young workers should be 
lower than for prime-aged workers, and also lower for women than for men. This is 
borne out by the data (see inter alia Shimer (1999), Jaeger and Huff Stevens (1999) 
and  Neumak, Polsky and Hansen (1999) for the US, and Booth, Francesconi and 
Garcia Serrano, 1999 for Britain).12 
 
In contrast, firms with high firing costs – relative to their hiring costs – show a 
greater tendency to hire women and young workers and to lay off their prime-aged 
men in recessions. The preference for laying off loyal and stable prime-aged workers 
may seem surprising but comes quite naturally out of our model – it is the Pigou-
Becker effect put on its head, since quitting reduces the expected return from firing 
workers. This gives a third empirical prediction of our analysis: 
 
                                                 
12 Although the US is not characterised by high statutory employment protection costs as in Europe, US 
firms may still face significant layoff costs through, for example, the costs of sabotage that may be 
imposed on firms by disgruntled workers who have been fired. It is hard to measure the extent of 
sabotage costs, since the ex-ante expectation of sabotage induces firms to employ policies to deter it 
(for example avoiding of advance notification, insistence of instant clearing out of desks, offering a 
generous final payment in lieu of advance notification, etc. See Addison and Chilton (1997) and Kuhn 
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• When firing costs are raised, the negative effect of quitting on the hiring and 
training of new workers is at least partially alleviated. Firms become more willing 
to hire  workers with higher quit rates.  
 
The positive effect of employment-protection legislation on on-the-job training has 
been advanced in the literature (see for example Booth and Chatterji, 1997; Saint 
Paul, 1996) but for a different reason – to compensate for lost shared training 
investments. Here we find another reason: Firms may prefer workers with a higher 
quit rate because the option to hire them is worth less with stringent employment 
protection – it takes a higher level of productivity for a firm to give a loyal worker the 
job security that comes along with employment protection. 
 Our model also has implications for worker composition at the industry and 
occupational level. Women, displaced older men approaching retirement, and young 
workers, should be disproportionately represented in industries characterised by 
uncertain future prospects and relatively low hiring and training costs. These typically 
involve low skill/low pay jobs or what has been called secondary-sector jobs in the 
theory of dual labour markets (see Saint-Paul, 1996) among others. More stable 
industries, and those characterised by high hiring- and training costs, on the other 
hand, will have a more permanent workforce of loyal – presumably prime-aged –  
workers. In Table 1, we summarise some of the testable implications of our theory. 
These predictions might be tested against cross-country data (in order to get 
variations in employment protection costs) disaggregated by sector, and with 
measures of sector-specific demand volatility.  
                                                                                                                                            
(1992) for theoretical rationales for advance notification in a different context. 
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Table 1: Testable Predictions 
 
      Variable Highly volatile occupations, low ratio of hiring to firing costs [1] 
High ratio of hiring to firing 
costs,  both high volatility and 
low volatililty [2] 
   Employment     
   composition 
Relatively more youth, women, people near 
retirement age than in [2]. 
Proportionately more prime-aged men 
than in [1].  
   Employment  
   inflows and  
   outflows 
Very careful vetting of hirees: Relatively 
more youth, women, people near retirement 
age hired. Proportionately more voluntary 
outflows than in [2] 
Very careful vetting of hirees - few 
quitters are hired, so inflows are 
proportionately more prime-aged men. 
Voluntary outflows lower than in [1]. 
Women, men approaching retirement 
and young disproportionately 
casualties of layoffs. 
   Duration of  
   Unemployment 
 
Longer for the prime-aged  men. Longer for women, youth and older  people cet. par. 
    Average job  
    tenure 
High for prime-aged men, lower for women, 
youth and older workers. 
Workforce comprises proportionately 
more ‘loyal’ workers who have longer 
tenure, so average job tenure here 
longer than [1]. 
    Average  
    unemployment Higher for prime-aged men. Lower for prime-aged men. 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
We have described the derminants of the strength of the adverse effect of quitting on 
hiring and training of new workers when there is uncertainty about the level of future 
productivity. We have found that the effect is stronger, the larger is the  ratio of hiring 
to firing costs. While the dependence on the level of hiring costs comes as no surprise, 
the value added of our paper is the role of firing costs: A fall in firing costs enhances 
the quitting effect just as an increase in the level of hiring costs does. The quitting 
effect emphasised by authors from Pigou (1912) to Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) is 
thus endogenously determined and affected by labour-market institutions.  
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 We also demonstrated that the firing decision is a mirror image of the hiring 
decision where hiring- and firing costs change places. So when productivity is not 
expected to recover, firms prefer laying off low-quit groups (i.e. prime-age workers), 
if the ratio of firing- to hiring costs is large. This may seem counterintuitive at first but 
the argument is identical to that of why high quits discourage training – by laying off a 
loyal worker the firm is reducing future losses by more since he would not have left 
on his own accord. But when hiring costs become  more  significant, this becomes a 
risky strategy as it becomes costly to replace workers if productivity recovers. Thus 
with high hiring costs and uncertainty about the future, firms may opt for laying off 
their more mobile workers. 
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Appendix  
 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (5) 
 
The problem is to solve equation (3) for ( )gNV , , which is the value of employing all 
current workers. The solution for ( )gNV ,  consists of a particular integral and a 
complementary function. The particular integral of this equation can be written as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] (A.1)                 . 1,
0
∫
∞
−−−
−−= dteNewNeglgNV tttt
P ρλθλθ
 
Eq. (2) in the text is an explicitly solvable stochastic differential equation known as 
the stochastic Verlhusrt equation. [see Kloeden and Platen (1992), p125] The value of 
g at time t is                                   ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )A2                              .2/exp1
2/exp
0
2
0
2
0
∫ +−+
+−
= tt
dszsgg
ztgg
g
σσµµ
σσµ
 
(A1) can be reduced to the following equation when σ approaches zero, 
                                         ( )[ ]
( )A3                                      .
1 00
tgt eggg
gg µ−
⋅−+
=
 
Substituting (A3) into (A1) and differentiating with  respect to N give (5) in the text. 
( ) ( ) ( ) (A4)                   . *
1
1,
0
1
∫
∞
−
+−
−
+
−





 −
+
−=
λρ
θ
µ
ρθλ
θθ wdt
e
g
gg
elNggNv
tg
t
P
 
 Numerical calculations show that (A3) is a good proxy for (A2) when σ is small. 
Rewrite (2) as a discrete stochastic differential equation 
( ) ( ) ( )5            .1,0~     , ANgttggggg tttttttt εεσµ ∆+∆−=−∆+  
The integral part of (A1) is   
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )6            .expexp
0
max
000
AttngNdttgN
n tnt∫ ∑
∞
=
∆ ∆∆+−≅+− θλρθλρ θθ  
The results of Monte Carlo numerical calculations of (A6) are shown in Fig A-1. The 
error term is the percentage difference when gt  follows (A5) or (A3).  
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Figure A-1. Parameters: µ = 0.4, g0 = 1.4 , g = 1 , ∆t = 0 01. , ρ = 0.05, 
θ = 1, λ = 0.15, and total number of Monte Carlo calculations, max, is 
100,000. 
 
 
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (6)-(7) 
Now only focusing on the homogenous part of equation (3), we define vG  as the value 
of the marginal worker and differentiate the homogenous part with respect to N. This 
gives, 
( ) ( ) (A7)                       . 
2
1 22
Nggg Nvgvggvgv λµσλρ −−+=+  
 Suppose the general solution to equation (A7) has the following functional form 
                                               )8A(                                                    ),(ghNAgv αβ=  
where ( ) ( )11 −−⋅= θθαlBA  and B is constant. Note that l should be a function of quits 
and thus will affect option values. However, since l is not a state variable, it would be 
convenient to treat ( )l−1  as constant when deriving the option values. This gives the 
following relationships 
                                          )A9(                                                 ),(1 ghNgAvN
−
=
αβα  
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] )0(A1         ,'+ αββ µβµµ NghgAgggghAggggvgg g −−=−  
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Substituting (A9), (A10) and (A11) into (A7) gives 
    
( ) ( ) ( )
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 Equation (A12) must hold for any value of v, so that bracketed terms in both the 
first and second lines of the equation must equal zero. First we choose β to set the 
bracketed terms in the first line of the equation equal to zero: 
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The value of α is arbitrary and needs to be determined by economic restrictions. In 
equilibrium, the integral of (4) becomes  
( ) ( ) ( ) (A14)                             .
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The option value ( )v N g,  should have the same composite in N and g. That is, 
( )v N g,  should depend on just the single composite variable, gN θ −1 . Therefore, α 
should equal ( )β θ − 1 . Substituting into (A13) gives 
                         
( ) ( )( ) ( ) (A15)                        .011
2
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 From the second line of equation (A12), we get 
                   
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) (A16)                     0.='+''
2
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By making the substitution x g= 2 2µ σ , we can transform equation (A16) into a 
standard form. Let h(g) = f(x). Then (A13) becomes 
                                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (A17)                              ,0''' =−−+ xfxfxbxxf β  
where b g= +2 2 2β µ σ . Equation (A17) is known as Kummer's equation. Its 
solution is the confluent hypergeometric function ( )H x b; ,β , which has the following 
series representation: 
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Thus, (A8) becomes 
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As long as l is not a function of g and N, we can substitute ( ) ( )11 −−⋅= θθαlBA  
( )βθlB −⋅= 1  into the above equation, which gives 
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